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Thinking back about past events often involves a vivid memory of the people, the places
and the context involved. Clear pictures of conference venues and cities that seem
frozen in time come to mind when thinking about past scientiVc meetings. The vi-
sual nature of our memories may be taken as an example of the embodied view of
language and cognition, which is the general topic of this volume. On this account,
our knowledge about the world is grounded in sensory and motor concepts that were
acquired through bodily experience. For instance, the concept ‘to grasp’ entails a mo-
tor representation of the hand action that is involved in actual grasping. In line with
this suggestion, it has been found that the processing of action verbs is associated with
activation in similar regions in the premotor cortex that are involved in the actual exe-
cution of the action that the verb refers to (Pulvermuller, 2013). Similarly, understanding
a concept like ‘grasping’ when observing the action of another person has also been as-
sociated with activation in motor-related brain regions, suggesting that a process of
motor simulation could support action understanding (Gallese & LakoU, 2005).
In the last decade, we have seen an enormous interest in embodied cognition theories
among scholars from a wide range of diUerent backgrounds. Cognitive neuroscientists
have primarily investigated the when and how of activation in modality-speciVc brain
areas in response to language and concept processing (van Elk, van Schie, & Bekkering,
2014). Psychologists have experimentally determined the bidirectional relation between
bodily and cognitive processing (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). Philosophers have focused on
the question whether embodied simulation processes meet the necessary and suXcient
requirements to support higher-level processes such as mind reading or false belief un-
derstanding (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005). Linguists have investigated how our everyday
use of concrete and abstract language in written and spoken form is related to basic
sensory and motor concepts (Gibbs, 2003).
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I am convinced that this multidisciplinary approach is one of the major strengths of
embodied cognition. In a time in which many scientiVc disciplines have become increas-
ingly specialized, a unifying theory that spans diUerent domains and that ranges from
developmental psychology to linguistics and from philosophy to dynamical systems
theory has a great potential. At the same time, the challenges faced by such a multidis-
ciplinary approach are non-trivial as each Veld is characterized by specialist problems
that are often deVned by the use of a speciVc jargon. This theoretical challenge was
faced directly at the Sensory-Motor-Concepts in Language and Cognition meeting, in
which linguists, philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists participated – all with
a shared interest in embodied cognition. As can be seen in the contributions to this vol-
ume a wide range of topics was addressed from a variety of diUerent perspectives and
encompassing both experimental and theoretical contributions. An intriguing ques-
tion is whether these diUerent contributions are related and how they could lead to a
cross-fertilization of ideas.
A possible starting point for such an integrative attempt is to acknowledge that al-
though the topics addressed by diUerent disciplines may be diUerent, they all share
a similar conceptual framework. At this point, an interesting parallel can be drawn
with evolutionary accounts of language. Starting from the premise that language con-
ferred an adaptive advantage in the ontogeny of our species, diUerent disciplines have
focused on more proximate or ultimate causes of language development (Arbib, 2005).
For instance, anthropological accounts have investigated the fossil records to determine
precursors of the human vocal tract as a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of
language. Developmental psychologists typically conduct experimental studies to in-
vestigate how infants over the course of their Vrst years acquire basic language abilities
that often seem to go beyond the linguistic input that they received. Neuroscientists
have elucidated the neural networks underlying language production and processing
and have pointed out a striking overlap between the brain areas involved in the pro-
duction of language and gestures, suggesting that gestural communication could be a
precursor of a prototype of language. Thus, although diUering in their topic of in-
vestigation and their experimental approach, these Vndings converge on the idea that
language should be understood in terms of its adaptive function and its relation to other
more basic forms of action and communication.
Similarly, within the framework of embodied cognition the diUerent approaches con-
verge on the notion that language and cognition involve the use of sensory motor con-
cepts. This may be reWected in the use of metaphors referring to concrete sensory
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motor domains, eUects of concrete experiences on word reading and the activation of
sensory motor brain areas in response to reading action verbs. Furthermore, each of the
diUerent domains can be characterized by similar discussions regarding the question
whether an embodied cognition explanation is the only and most viable account of the
extant data. For instance, embodied theories of conceptual content are often contrasted
with amodal theories, according to which our thinking is based on an internal and sym-
bolic ‘language of thought’ that is abstracted away from concrete experience (Mahon &
Caramazza, 2008). One important argument that is often used in the debate between
embodied and amodal theories of cognition is the grounding problem: it remains un-
clear how concepts derive meaning if they are unrelated to concrete experiences (Barsa-
lou, 2008). The embodied account proposes an intuitive and plausible solution to this
problem: the meaning of concepts is derived from the fact that concepts are by deV-
nition sensorimotor in nature. More recently, several authors have proposed a hybrid
model according to which semantic processing involves both multimodal and modality-
speciVc processing (Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010; Ralph, Sage, Jones, & Mayberry, 2010).
These ideas may lead to a conceptual reVnement of the current theoretical ideas and
it would be interesting to see whether eventually theoretical integration is possible, not
only within speciVc research domains such as neuroscience or psychology, but across
diUerent domains as well. The collection of papers in this volume provides an excellent
Vrst attempt for such an endeavor.
Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge Liane Ströbel without whom this
project would not have been possible. She organized a stimulating conference and took
the eUort of making the proceedings of this meeting available in the form of this special
issue of Düsseldorf University Press. It is my sincere hope that the discussions that
were started throughout this project will be continued in the future and will lead to a
further exchange of people and ideas.
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